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[L. A. No. 24825. In Bank. Mar. 12,1959.]

WILLIAM R. WARD et a1., Respondents, v. MARSHALL W.
TAGGART et a1., Appellants.
[1] Fraud-Damages.-Although the evidence may support a finding of fraud, where there is no proof that plaintiffs suffered
"out-of-pocket" loss for profits allegedly wrongfully acquired
by defendants, there can be DO recovery in tort for fraud.
(Civ. Code, § 3343.)
[2] Id.-Damages.-In the absence of a fiduC?iary relationship, recovery in a tort action for fraud is limited to the actual damages suffered by plaintiff.
[8] RestitutiOD and UIYUBt Enrichment-Theory of Recovery.Public policy does Dot permit one to "take advantage of his
own wrong" (Civ. Code, § 3517), and the law provides a quasicontractual remedy to prevent one from being unjustly enriched at the expense of another.
[1] See Oal.J'ur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 89.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Fraud, 187.1; [2] Fraud, § 87; [3,12]
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 11; [4] Brokers, 138; [5]
Brokers, § 45; [6, 7] Appeal and Error, 1119; [8] Appeal and
Error, §l20; [9] Brokers, 148; [10] Trusts, 1136; [11,15] Dam.
ages, §l36; [13,16] Brokers, 147; [14] Damages, 1137.
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[4] Brokers-Dntie!!.-·A re,,] ('~t"fp. hwker has the duty to be
honest and ttllthfnl in hi,; (lC'nliul!". cBus. & Prof. Code,
§§ 10150,10176.)
[5] Id.-Duties and Liabilities-Evidence.-The evidence supported a finding that defendllnt broker violated his duty to be
honest and truthful in his dealing where, through fraudulent
representntions, he received money that plaintiffs (purchasers
of the property involved) would otherwise have had by fraudulently representing that the price was $1,000 per acre more
than was asked by the seller, thus making himself an involuntary trustee (Civ. Code, § 2224) for plaintiffs' benefit on the
. secret profit of $1,000 per acre that he made from his dealings
with them.
[6] Appea.l-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-A change
in theory is permitted on appeal when a question of law only
is presented on facts appearing in the I·ecord.
[7] Id.-Objections-Adberence to Theory of Case.-The general
rule confining the parties on appeal to the theory advanced
below is based on the rationale that the opposing party should
not be required to defend for the first time on appeal against
a new theory that contemplates a factual situation the consequenees of which are open to controversy and were not put
in issue or presented at the trial.
[8] Id.-Objections-Adberence To Theory of Case.-Although the
facts pleaded and proved by plaintiffs do not sustain a judg-·
ment on the theory of tort, they may be sufficient to uphold
recovery on appeal under the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment where that theory does not contemplate any
factual situation different from that established by the evidence in the trial court.
[9] Brokers-Liabilities-Judgment.-A judgment for a sum representing $1,000 per acre secret profit realized by defendant
broker was proper as against him but was improper as against
his codefendant where, though she permitted her name to be
used in dual escrows, she did not share in the illicit profit.
[10] Trusts-Constructive Trusts.-One cannot be held to be a constructive trustee of something he has not acquired.
[11] Damages-Exemplary Damages.-In Civ. Code, § 3294, authorizing exemplllry damages in an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract where defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, the woril. "contract" is
used in its ordinary sense to menn an agreelllent between the
[4] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Brokers, § 52 et seq.; Am.Jur., Brokers, § 85
et seq.
[6] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 142.
IU C.2d-24
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pOTt.il's, not Iln ob1i~lItion impospfl hy 11lw despite the absence
of sneh IIJ:TPr.mpnt.
[12] Restitution and Unjust Enrichment-Basis for Measuring
Liability.-Where defendant broker's obligation for illicit
profits did not arise from any agreement between him and
plaintiff, but arose from his fraud and violation of statutory
duties, his fraud is not waived by the seeking of recovery on
the theory of unjust enrichment, since it is the foundation of
the implied-in-Iaw promise to disgorge. Such promise is purely
fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to circumvent
rigid common-law pleading, and is invoked not to deny a remedy but to create one for the purpose of bringing about justice
without reference to the intention of the parties.
[13] Brokers-Liabilities-Damages.-Where defendant broker's
obligation as constructive trustee for his fraud did not arise
from contract but was imposed by law, a judgment against
him for exemplary damages clearly fell within Civ. Code,
§ 3294, nuthorizing such damages in an action for breach of an
obligation not arising from contract where defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.
[14] Damages-Exemplary Damages.-Courts award exemplary
damages to discourage oppression, fraud or malice by punishing the wrongdoer.
[15] ld.-Exemplary Damages.-Exemplary damages are appropriate in cases seeking to recover profits allegedly wrongfully
acquired by defendant; restitution 'Would have little or no
deterrent effect, since wrongdoers would run no risk of liability to their victims beyond that of returning what they
wrongfully obtained.
[16] Brokers-Liabilities-Damages.-In an action against a real
estate broker for profits allegedly wrongfully acquired by him,
the broker was not entitled to have the compensatory damages
against him reduced by a sum representing commissions paid
to other persons and the costs of two escrows where those
expenses were either incurred to accomplish the fraud or it
was entirely speculative whether the amounts so paid would
have been paid by plaintiffs or the seller had the transaction
been a legitimate one.
.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joe Raycraft, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Action against a real estate broker and his employee to
recover an illicit profit obtained by the broker through fraud.
Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed as to defendant broker, reversed as to defendant employee.
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.Tames C. Blackstock and Felix H. McGinnis for Appellants.
Chandler P. Ward for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-At plaintiff William R. Ward's request in
February, 1955, LeRoy Thomsen, a real estate broker, undertook to look for properties that might be of interest to Ward
for purchase. During a conversation about unrelated matters, defendant :Marshall W. Taggart, a real estate broker, told
Thomsen that as exclusive agent for Sunset Oil Company he
had several acres of land in Los Angeles County for sale.
Thomsen said that he had a client who might be interested in
acquiring this property. When Thomsen mentioned to Taggart that another broker named Dawson had a "For Sale"
sign on the property, Taggart replied that Sunset had taken
the listing away from Dawson. With Ward's authorization
'l'holllsen submitted an offer on his behalf to Taggart of $4,000
an acre. Taggart promised to take the offer to Sunset. Taggart
later told Thomsen that Sunset had refused the offer and
would not take less for the property than $5,000 an acre,
one-half in cash. Thomsen conveyed this information to Ward,
who directed Thomsen to make an offer on those terms. Thomsen did so in writing. At Taggart's direction, Thomsen
inserted in the offer a provision for payment by Sunset of a
10 per cent commission, which Taggart and Thomsen agreed
to divide equally. On the following day Thomsen informed
Ward of the provision for the commission and Ward agreed
to it. Subsequently, Taggart told Thomsen that Sunset had
accepted Ward's offer and presented to him proposed escrow
instructions naming Taggart's business associate, defendant
H. M. Jordan, as seller acting for Taggart. Taggart stated
that his designation as principal would enable him to "clear
up the Dawson exclusive listing" as well as certain blanket
mortgages on the property. Thomsen told Ward of this
arrangement when he submitted the escrow instructions to
him. When Ward asked why Jordan was to be the payee of
the notes and the beneficiary of the trust deeds, Thomsen
replied that Taggart had said the arrangement was prompted
by certain tax and other problems of the Sunset Oil COl}lpany
and that the trust deeds would be turned over to Sunset
after the escrow. Plaintiffs paid $360,246 for the 72.0492
acres conveyed to them.
Plaintiffs did not learn until after they had purchased tIle
property that Taggart had never been given a listing by

)

740

. WABD II. TAGGART

[51 C.2d

Sunset and that he had never presented to Sunset and never
intended to present plaintiHs' offers of $4,000 and $5,000 per
acre. Instead, he presented his own offer of $4,000 per acre,
which Sunset accepted. He falsely represented to plaintiffs
. that the least Sunset would take for the property was $5,000
per acre, because he intended to purchase the property from
. Sunset himself and resell it to plaintiffs at a profit of $1,000
per acre. All the reasons he gave for thc unusual handling
of the sale were fabrications. He never disclosed Ward's
offer to Sunset until after the escrow papers were signed.
All of the money he used to pay Sunset the purchase price
came from the Ward escrow.
PlaintiHs brought an action in tort charging fraud on the
part of Taggart and Jordan. The ease was tried without a
jury, and the court entered judgment against both defendants
for $72,049.20 compensatory damages, and against Taggart
for $36,000 exemplary damages. The judgment also enjoined
defendants from transferring notes and trust deeds received
from plaintiffs and ordered them to discharge these and
thereby reduce the amount of the judgment. Defendants
appeal.
Defendants contend that the judgment must be reversed on
the ground that, there can be no recovery in a tort action for
fraud without proof of the actual or "out-of-pocket" losses
sustained by the plaintiff and that in the present ease there
was no evidence that the property was worth less than plaintiffs paid for it. Defendants invoke section 3343 of the Civil
Code, which provides that one "defrauded in the purchase,
sale or exchange of property is entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that with which the defrauded
person parted and the actual value of that which he received,
• • ." [1] Although, as defendants admit, the evidence is
clearly sufficient to support the finding of fraud, the only
evidence submitted on the issue of damages was that the property was worth at least $5,000 per acre, the price plaintiffs
paid for it. Since there was no proof that plaintiffs suffered
"out-of-pocket" loss, there can be no recovery in tort for
fraud. (Bagdasarian v. eragnon, 31 Ca1.24 744, 762-763
[192 P.2d 935].)
Plaintiffs contend, however, that their recovery is not
limited to actual damages, on the ground that section 3343 does
not apply to a tort action to recover secret profits. They
rely principally on Orogan v. Mete, 47 Ca1.2d 398 [303 P.2d
1029] ; Savage v. Mayer, 33 Ca1.2d 548 [203 P.2d 9] ; Terry v.
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Bender, 143 Cal.App.2d 198 [300 P.2d 119] ; Simone v. McKee,
142 Ca1.App.2d 307 [298 P.211 G6i]; Ramey v. Myers, III
Cal.App.2d 679 [245 P.2d 360] ; and Adams v. Harrison, 34
Cal.App.2d 288 [93 P.2d 237]. These cases all involved situations in which the defendant was the agent of the defrauded
person or in which a confidential or fiduciary relationship
existed between the parties. They rest on the theory that
"the .principal's right to recover does not depend upon any
deceit of the agent, but is based upon the duties incident to
the agency relationship and upon the fact that all profits
resulting from that relationship belong to the principal."
(Savage v. Mayer, supra, 33 Ca1.2d at 551.) In the present
case, however, there is no evidence of an agency or other
fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs and defendant Taggart or defendant Jordan. Plaintiffs dealt at arms length
with Taggart through their agent Thomsen. At no time did
Taggart purport to act for plaintiffs. There is no evidence
of any prior dE'.alings between the parties or any acquaintanceship or special relationship that would create a fiduciary
duty of defendants to plaintiffs. [2] In the absence of a
fiduciary relationship, recovery in a tort action for fraud is
limited to the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.
(Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal.2d 398,405 [303 P.2d 1029] ; Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 744, 762-763.)
[3] Even though Taggart was not plaintiff's agent, the
public policy of this state does not permit one to "take advantage of his own wrong" (Civ. Code, § 3517), and the law
provides a quasi-contractual remedy to prevent one from being
unjustly enriched at the expense of another.l Section 2224
of the Civil Code provides that one "who gains a thing by
fraud ... or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other
and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing
gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have
had it." [4] As a real estate broker, Taggart had the duty
to be honest and truthful in his dealings. (See Bus. & Prof.
Code, §§ 10150, 10176; Rattray v. 8cudder, 28 Ca1.2d 214,
222-223 [169 P.2d 371, 164 A.L.R. 1356].) [6] The evidence
is clearly sufficient to support a finding that Taggart violated
this duty. Through fraudulent misrepresentation!! he received money that plaintiffs would otherwise have had. Thus,
Taggart is an involuntary trustee for the benefit of plaintiffs
'Section 3343 provides that" nothing herein contained shall be deemed
to deny to nny IJerson having a cause of action for fraud or deeeit any
legal or equitable remedies to which such person may be entitled."
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on the secret profit of $1,000 per acre that he made from his
dealings with them.
[6] Although this theory of recovery was not advanced
by plaintiffs in the trial court, it is settled that a change in
theory is permitted on appeal when •• a question of law only
is presented on the facts appearing in the reeord. . • ."
. (Panopulos v. Mac7cris, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [303 P.2d 738] ;
American Auto. Ins. 00. v. Seaboard Slirety 00., 155 Cal.App.
2d 192, 200 [318 P.2d 84].) [7] The general rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory advanced below
is based on the rationale that the opposing party should not
be required to defend for the first time on appeal against a
new theory that "contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put
in issue or presented at the trial." (Panopulos v. Maderis,
sup"a,47 Ca1.2d at 341.) Such is not the case here. [8] Although the facts pleaded and proved by plaintiffs do not sustain the judgment on the theory of tort, they are sufficient to
uphold recovery under the quasi-contractual theory of unjust
enrichment since that theory does not contemplate any factual
situatiou different from that established by the evidence in the
trial court. Defendants were given ample opportunity to
present their version of the transaction involved, and the.>
issue of whether or not their actions constituted fraud was
decided adversely to them by the trial court.
[9] Accordingly, the judgment for $72,049.20, representing the $1,000 per acre secret profit, against defendant Taggart must be affirmed. The judgment against defendant
Jordan, however, must be reversed. Although she permitted
her name to be used in the dual escrows, she did not share
in the illicit profit that Taggart obtained. [10] One cannot
be held to be a constructive trustee of something he has not
acquired.
Taggart contends that if recovery is based on the theory of
unjust enrichment, the judgment for exemplary damages must
be reversed. The argument runs that under this theory the
law implies a promise to return the money wrongfully obtained, that the }llailltiff waivps the tort avd snes in assumpsit
on an implied contmet, and that since 1'IU,·h all action is
"contractual" in nature, it doe.>s 110t admit of the.> exemplary
damages a]]oweu undpr spction 3294 of tIle Civil Code. That
section authorizes ext>mplury damagcs "jn an action for the
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice ...• "
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[11] The word "contract" is used in this section in its ordilIary sense to mean an agreement. betw('en tlle parties, not an
obligation imposed by law d('spite the ab~ence of any such
agreemcnt. [12] Taggart's obligation do('s not arisc from
any agreement between him and plaint.iffs. It aril)('s from his
. fraull and yiolation of statutory duties. His fraud is not
waived, for it is the very foundation of the implied-in-law
promise to disgorge. (See Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit
In Ass1lmpsit, 19 Yale L.J. 221, 243-246.) The promise is
purely fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to circumvent rigid common law pleading. It was invoked not to
deny a remedy, but to create one "for the purpose of bringing
about justice without reference to the intention of the parties. "
'1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.) p. 9; see Desny v. Wilder,
46 Ca1.2d 715, 735 [299 P.2d 257].) [13] Since Taggart's
obligation for his fraud does not arise from contract but is
imposed by la,,,, the judgment for exemplary damages clearly
falls within section 3294. (See Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36,
39-40; Briggs v. Rodriguez, 236 S.W.2d 510, 514-516 (Tex.
Civ.App); 30 Tex.L.Rev. 371, 372.) In Crogan v. Metz, 47
Ca1.2d 398 [303 P.2d 1029], the only action sustainable nnder
the pleadings was an actioll for breach of an agent's contractual duties. In Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Ca1.2d 713 [221 P.2d
9], the plaintiff was estopped to allege a cause of action in
tort to recover exemplary damages because he had obtained
a writ of attachment in pursuit of the contractual remedy,
"whereby he has gained advantage over the other party."
(35 Ca1.2d at 720.)
[14] Courts award exemplary damages to discourage oppres.~ion, fraud, or malice by punishing the wrongdoer. (See
l\leCormick, Damages, § 79 ; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1185-1188.) [15] Such damages are appropriate in cases like the present one, where
restitution would hayc little or no deterrent effect, for wrongdoers would run no ril'k of liability to their victims beyond
that of returning what they wrongfully obtained. (Haigler v.
Donnelly, 18 Ca1.2d 674, 680-682 [117 P.2d 331]; Taylor v.
Wright, 69 Cal.App.2d 371, 384-386 [159 P.2d 980] ; Hartzell
Y. Myal1, 115 Cal.App.2d 670, 676-678 [252 P.2d 676] ; Foster
v. Kcat£ng, 120 Cal.App.2d 435, 454-455 [261 P.2d 529];
lhv(~1's V. U"eenwood, 13H Cal.App.2d 345, 350 [293 P.2d
H:J4j.)

'rh\! l't'c:ord hel'l'iu discloses liu «Lnst' of dis('l'diolJ

in the award of exemplary damages. (Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Ca1.2d 791, 802 [197 P.2d 713]; Finney v.
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Lockhart, 35 Ca1.2d 161, 164 [217 P.2d 19]; State Rubbish
etc. Assll. v. 8ilizno/f, 38 CaI.2d 330, 340-341 [240 P.2tl 282} ;
Hartzell v. Myall, supra; Foster v. KcaHng, supra; see 14 Cal.
Jur.2d 813-818.)
[16] Taggart finally contends that he is (,Iltitled to a deduction of the cost to him of the transaction except those
items incurred to accomplish his fraud. He seeks to reduce
the compensatory damages by $25,563.10, representing the
commission of $15,012.30 paid to Thomsen; the $5,900 commission paid to Harvey Nelson, former land manager of Sunset
Oil Company; the $616 cost of the two escrows, one of which
channeled title from Sunset to Jordan and the other from
Jordan to plaintiffs; and the $4,034.80 paid to Dawson, who
had an exclusive agency on the property, to cancel his contract.
The $5,900 paid to Nelson and the cost of the Jordan escrow
were expenses incurred to accomplish the fraud; they would
not have been necessary to a legitimate transaction. It is clear
that these expenses must be disallowed. Since it is entirely
speculative whether the commissions paid to Thomsen and
Dawson and the cost of the second escrow would have been paid
by plainti1fs or Sunset had the transaction been a legitimate
one, it would be inequitable to permit Taggart to deduct any
.of these expenses from plaintiffs' recovery. (See Kinert v.
Wright,81 Cal.App.2d 919, 927 [185 P_2d 364] ; Titlc Insurance • TrtUJt Co. v. Oaliforllia Dc'/). Co., 171 Cal. 173 [152
P. 542]; McArthur v. Goodwin, 173 Cal. 499 [160 P. 679].)
The judgment against Taggart is affirmed. The judgment
against Jordan is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and McComb,
J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
the judgment because it comes as close to affording justice
to the wronged plaintiffs as appears possible under the presently established decisional law of this state as it interprets
and applies section 3343 of the Civil Code. In fact this
l1('cision, by its ingenious innovation and' application of a
tonstructive trust-unjust enrichment-quasi-contractual theory
to support an award of exemplary damages as against one of
the defendants, avoids much of the evil effect of the majority
holding in Bagdasariall v. Gragnon (1948), 31 Cal.2d 744,
759-763 [192 P.2d 935], and is therefore to that extent desirable.

I
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---------------------But. because the 5ubje('t ~pet.ion 8S llO'V interpreted and
applied still constitutes more of a shield for, than a sword
against, fraud perpetrators, I deem it proper to once more
direct attention to it in the hope that the Legislature--if not
this court by forthright overruling of Bagdasarian-may provide a remedy.
The judgment of the trial court is amply supported by the
evidence and would clearly be supported by the law as against
both defendants were it not for the conclusion reached ill
the Bagdasarian case that the addition in 1935 of section 3343
to the Civil Code (Stats. 1935, ch. 536, p. 1612, § 1) operated
to repeal and supplant the previously existing law governing
the measure of damages in fraud cases. It was my view then,
and still is, that section 3343 was intended by the Legislature
to provide an alternative, not the exclusive, measure of damages in such cases.
As pointed out by Professor Williston, under the construction of the statute adopted by the majority in the Bagdasarian
case, •• a fraudulent person can in no event lose anything by
his fraud. He runs the chance of making a profit if he successfully carries out his plan and is not afterward brought to
account for it; and if he is brought to account, he at least
will lose nothing by his misconduct." (5 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), 3886, § 1392.)
In this connection it is to be noted that the legislation as
adopted in California (Stats. 1935, ch. 536, p. 1612, § 1)
expressly declares that "Nothing herein contained shall be
deemed to deny to any person having a cause of action for
fraud or deceit any legal or equitable remedies to which such
person may be entitled." I would prefer to reconsider the
ruling in the Bagdasarian case and hold that the remedy added
by the statute of 1935 is in truth an addition to, rather than a
restriction on, the remedies of the person defrauded. So
holding, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, including the award of exemplary damages as against both defendants.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 8,
1959.
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